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The Behavior of U.S. Deficits
ABSTRACT
The tax—smoothing theory suggests that deficits would respond particu-
larly to recession, temporarily high government spending, and anticipated
inflation. My empirical estimates indicate that a relation of this type is
reasonably stable in the U.S. since at least 1920. In particular, the sta-
tistical evidence does 'not support the idea that there has been a shift toward
a fiscal policy that generates either more real public debt on average or
that generates larger deficits in response to recessions. Further, the def?—
cits for 1982—83 and projections for 1984 are consistent with the previous
structure. The high values of these deficits reflect the customary response





1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637Much recent attention has focused on the large values of actual and
projected federal deficits. In order to evaluate this discussion we have
to know whether these deficits represent a shift in the structure of the
government's fiscal policy, or just the usual reaction to other influences,
such as recession, inflation and government spending. A related, but
broader, question is whether the process that generates deficits in the
post—World War II period differs systematically from that in place earlier——
say, during the interwar period of 1920—40. For example, has there been
a change in the average deficit or in the magnitude of the countercyclical
response of deficits?
I begin by describing the tax—smoothing theory of deficits that I
developed earlier. Then I estimate this model on U.S. data since 1920.
Basically, the results are consistent with an unchanged structure of deficits
since that time. Specifically, the recent deficits and the near—term pro-
jections of deficits reflect mainly the usual responses to recession and,
it turns out, to anticipated inflation.
The Tax—Smoothing Model of Deficits
I analyze the determination of deficits within the framework of the
tax—smoothing model that I developed in an earlier paper (Barro,1979))
In this approach the government faces the exogenous, deterministic stream
of real expenditures, other than interest payments, as given by g(t)
The base of real taxable income is the deterministic amount y(t) ,which2
generally depends on the path of tax rates. I think of y(t) as a fixed
fraction of the economy's real GNP for period t .Let-r(t)be the average
tax rate at date t ,sothat the amount of real income—tax revenue is
t(t)y(t) .Then,if the real interest rate is the constant r and the
initial real public debt is b(O) ,thegovernment's budget constraint
in terms of present values is2
Ir(t)y(t)etdt =1g(t)ertdt+ b(O)
In the present formulation I do not separate out the revenue from money
creation from the government's other revenues. Rather, I think of infla-
tionary finance as a tax on the holdings of money. Then, in order to focus
on taxes in one period versus those in another, I combine the inflation tax
with the variety of other levies (on income, sales, property, etc.) that
apply at the same date. In particular, there seems to be no reason to give
special treatment to the inflationtax.3
Suppose that the allocative effects from taxation depend on the "average
marginal tax rate," Tm() ,foreach period. That is, the time pathof
in m
average marginal tax rates,-r (1) ,-r(2) ,... , influencespeople s
incentives to work, produce and consume in the various periods. Here I
take a Ramsey—like, optimal—taxation perspective in order to formulate a
testable positive theory of the government's choices of tax rates overtime.4
In particular, if each period is similar In terms of elasticities of labor
supply, etc., then the Ramsey formulation dictates roughly equal tax rates,
Tin(t),foreach period.5 More generally, this approach would allow the tax
rate to depend on time—varying features of the economy, such as war-or peace,3
boom or recession, and so on. But, in order to bring out themain implica-
tions of the approach, I assume to begin with that the government plans
for equal average marginal tax rates, Tm() ,ineach period. Then I
examine later some perturbations from this path of uniform taxation.
I assume that the average marginal tax rate for any period bears a
stable relation to that period's average tax rate, t(t) ——that is,
=f[t(t)] (2)
where the function f is invariant over time. In this case,the stabiliza-
tion of average marginal tax rates entails stabilizationof average tax
rates. If r denotes the constant value of the average tax rate,then the
government's intertemporal budget constraint in equation (1) impliesthat
this tax rate is
=((g(t)ertdt+ b(O)]/ y(t)e_tdt . (3)
Suppose that real government spending, g(t) ,andthe real tax base,
y(t) ,arefluctuating around trend values that grow at the common rate n
That is, the time paths, g*(t) =g*(O)entand y*(t) =y*(O)ethave the
samepresentvalues as the respective adtual time paths, g(t) and y(t)•6





Dropping the time subscripts and substituting back into equation (3) yields
the formula for the (stabilized) average tax rate,
=[g*+(r_n)b]Iy* (5)
Hence, the tax rate equals the ratio of normal real spending to normal real
income, where normal real spending includes the real interest payments on
the outstanding public debt, rb ,lessthe amount financed by the usual
growth of the real debt, nb ,Idiscuss this last item further below.
The current deficit—which I think of as the change in the real quantity
of interest-bearing public debt, db/dt —is given at any date by
db/dt=g+rb_tyg+rby(g*+(rn)b]/y*
After rearranging terms, this expression becomes
db/dt (1y/y*)(g* + (r—n)b] + gg* + nb • (6)
The first term on the right side of equation (6) indicates that the real debt
rises when output is below "normal"——that is, when y/y <1.Effectively, tax
revenues fall in proportion to the fall in output (in order for the average
tax rate not to change). Hence, the amount of revenue lost is the proportional
shortfall of output, (1 —y/y*),multipliedby the normal amount of real
government spending (and revenues), g* + (r—n)b. Note that, when tax rates
are stabilized over tIme, the coefficient of the cyclical variable,
(ly/y*)[g* + (r—n)bl ,isunity in equation (6). Alternatively, If the5
government were to set relatively low tax rates during recessions, then
it would have to engineer a more dramatic countercyclical response of
deficits. In this case, the coefficient of the cyclical variable would
be greater than one. In any case, the present analysis does not distinguish
the automatic cyclical response of tax revenues under a given tax law
(which people sometimes try to filter out in the construction of a "full—
employment deficit") from that effected through "discretionary" fiscal
policy. For example, under a proportional income tax, average tax rates
tend automatically to be stabilized over the business cycle, while under a
graduated—rate setup, the average tax rate tends to be below normal during
recessions and vice versa for booms. Thus, a well designed tax system may
make it unnecessary to change the tax laws frequently in order to achieve
the desired cyclical pattern of tax rates. If the analysis included adjustment
costs for altering the tax laws, then it would be possible to study the
optimal design of these laws. But, for the present analysis, I assume that
some combination of automatic response within the tax system plus discretionary
changes in the laws achieves the desired behavior of deficits.
The second term on the right side of equation (6), g_g* ,indicates
that the real debt rises by the amount of temporarily high real government
spending. Thereby, the government avoids abnormally high tax rates during
periods when its expenditures are unusually high. Empirically, my measure
of temporary spending focuses on the unusually high levels of military
spending during wartime. Thus, the unitary coefficient on the (g_g*)
variable inequation (6) reflects the government's desire to equalize tax rates
during wartime and peacetime periods. Alternatively, if tax rates were above
normal during wars, then the coefficient on the (g_g*) variable would be less
than one.6
Finally, other things equal, the last term in equation (6) says that
the real debt grows at the rate n ,whichis the trend growth rate of the
economy. If the debt did not grow along with the economy, then interest
payments would fall over time relative to GNP, which would be inconsistent
with stabilizing the average tax rate.
Note that the present formulation deals with the conventional con-
cept of the funded real public debt, b .Sometimespeople suggest adding
the implicit debt that corresponds to the anticipated present value of social
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thepertinent variable for the government's decisions on taxes is g*
(plus the amount,(r—n)b) ,whichis the anticipated flow of normal
real spending.Aside from differences in the degree of uncertainty
attached to various categories of expenditures, it is clear that future social
security benefits play no special role——rather, they enter the analysis in
a manner analogous to future defense spending, etc. However, the debt could
be redefined if desired to include either the present value of social security
benefits or of other expenditures, This change in definition would not alter
the central economic problem, which concerns the government's choice of tax
rates at different dates. But, different concepts of deficits would surely
behave in different manners.
Suppose, for example, that people expect a bulge in social security
benefits to occur 5 years from now and to last for 10 years. On this count,
current spending g is below the normal flow g* ,whichcalls for a surplus
(db/dt <0)in equation (6). That is, the government raises taxescurrently
in order to prepare for the eventual bulge in spending. However, if the debt
included the present value of social security benefits, then the rise over
time in this present value (as the bulge in spending approaches) would7
offset the surplus in the funded debt. That is, the broader concept of
public debt——which included social security——would not tend to decline over
time. But, no matter how one defines the debt, the important point is that
the prediction for tax rates is identical. Namely, the expectation of a
bulge in future spending calls for a rise in current tax rates. (Unfortunately,
I have not yet isolated empirically this type of effect for prospective
government spending, whether for social security or for other types of
spending.)
Dividing through in equation (6) by the level of real debt, b ,the
results can be written in terms of the proportionate growth rate of the
real debt:
(l/b)db/dt =(1—y/y*)(g*/b+ r—n) +(g_g*)/b+ n (7)
Empirically, the term r—n is small relative to g*/b .(Thatis, norma].
real spending g* is large relative to real interest payments, rb ,less
the growth term, nb .) Hence, I neglect the term, r—n ,inthe subsequent
analysis. Then it is appropriate to measure g* as the normal amount of
real government expenditures exclusive of interest payments.
When the time paths g(t) and y(t) are uncertain, the values g* and
y* are also uncertain. I interpret these magnitudes in equation (7) as
corresponding to anticipated present values of real government spending and
GNP, assuming a known value of the real interest rate r . Possibly, some
further results could be obtained by modeling explicitly the uncertainty for
future government spending and private endowments.78
The main point is that new information about the long—run values of
spending, g* ,andincome, y* ,leadto corresponding changes in the average
tax rate, I, asshown in equation (5). Thus, the tax rate adjusts for sur-
prise changes in spending and income, but the sign or magnitude of the
necessary adjustments cannot be predicted in advance. In other words, the
tax rate follows a Martingale. However, some predictable changes in tax
rates may appear if——as mentioned before——the tax rate depends on the state
of the economy. For example, if tax rates were lower than normal during
recessions, then predictable increases in tax rates would occur along with
the (predictable) ends of recessions, Similarly, if tax rates were higher
than normal during wars, then predictable declines in tax rates would show
up at the (predictable) ends of wars. Thus, the Martingale property for
tax rates is not central to the approach followed in this paper.8
Another property of the theory is that it prescribes no target value
for the level of public debt or for the ratio of debt to income. A higher
initial value of debt is "undesirable" in the sense that it requires a
higher tax rate at each date (equation (5)), which then entails a larger
excess burden from taxation. But (with default ruled out), it is not worth-
while for the government systematically to run surpluses in order to pay
off the debt.9 Such a policy implies temporarily high tax rates, which
violates the tax—smoothing criterion. Thus, given the right—side variables
in equation (7), there is no independent effect on the growth rate of debt
from the starting value of the debt—income ratio. (This conclusion would still
follow even if the government varied the tax rate with the business cycle or
ith conditions of war and peace.)9
The above argumentisconsistent with the marked tendency of the
ratio of public debt to GNP to fall during peacetime, non—recession years.
(See Barro, 1984, Chapter 15, for the long—term evidence on this behavior
from the U.S. and the U.K.) The variable g* incorporates a country's
propensity to experience infrequent but possibly large wars. Therefore,
temporary spending, g —g*,isnegative rather than zero during the typical
peacetime year. Hence, the debt—income ratio tends to fall during peace-
time, and to rise sharply during the infrequent large wars.
If the price level follows a known path, then equation (7) describes
the time path of the real debt. Hence, the nominal debt——denoted by B——grows
at the rate of inflation, r ,plusthe amount shown on the right side of
equation (7). That is (neglecting the term, r—n ,inequation (7)),
(1/B)dB/dt=n+ir + (1 —y/)(g*/b)+(g —g*)/b . (8)
Notethatthe inflation rate, 71,hasa one—to—one effect on the growth rate
of the nominal debt.
A one—time surprise jump in the price level would shift the real debt,
b ,bya discrete amount in the opposite direction. Then, except for the
shift in b on the right side of equation (8), there would be no alteration
to the subsequent path of growth rates of the debt——in particular, there is
no tendency to adjust the nominal debt in order to compensate for the unex-
pected inflation (and thereby to restore some target value of the real debt).
It follows in equation (8) that the variable r should be replaced by the
expected rate of inflation, ¶e •(Inthe presence of indexed public
debt, the actual rate of inflation would be appropriate.)10
Th.￿ main point is that the planned growth rate of the real debt,
(l/B)(dBldt) — , dependson the real variables (other than iithat
appear on the right side of equation (8). Hence, the government'sdeficit
policy is specified in real terms, rather than being subject to some form
of money illusion.
Given the expected real interest rate r ,ahigher value of anticipated
inflation shows up as a higher nominal interest rate. Hence, the previous
result says that the government finances the (expected) inflation part of
its nominal interest payments by issuing new nominal debt, rather than by
levying taxes. Although this interpretation is suggestive, it turns out
that the results do not depend on a one—to—one relation between expected
inflation and nominal interest rates. Any discrepancy here appears as a
different value for the expected real interest rate. But a different level
for the real interest rate does not affect the growth rate of the debt in
equation (8) (assuming a given real growth rate, n ,andneglecting the
effect from the r —nterm in equation (7)). A permanently higher real
interest rate induces a once—and—for—all adjustment of the tax rate (equation
(5)), but no response of the deficit. On the other hand, if the expected
real interest were temporarily high or low, then the deficit would adjust
accordingly. Thus far, I have not investigated this possibility empirically.
•When the debt is long term there are also changes in the real market
value from changes in long—term nominal interest rates. A one—time jump in
the nominal interest rate shifts the current market value of the debt
by a discrete amount in the opposite direction. For example, Butkiewicz (1983)
shows that the market value of the debt (Bm) can be well approximated
empirically from the par value (Br) by using the formula,11
Bm B(l +hc)/(l+hR) , (9)
where c is the average coupon rate on the outstanding bonds, R is the
overall market yield, and h is the average maturity of the bonds. For
given values of c and h ,theeffect of a change in market yield on the
market value of debt is approximately
dBm/Bm —dR.h/(l +hR) . (10)
Equations (7) and (8) describe the paths of the market value of the real
and nominal debt, respectively, subsequent to the initial discrete shift in
market value at the moment of the one—time shift in yield. In particular,
this discrete shift affects subsequent growth rates of the debt only through
the change in b on the right side of the equations (and by any change in
expected inflation that accompanies the shift in the long—term nominal
interest rate). As with a surprise change in the price level, there is no
tendency to return to a normal real market value of the debt. But, in order
to explain the overall movements in the market value of the debt, it is necessary
to include an additional variable——such as that shown in equation (l0)——in
order to measure the effect of surprise changes in interest rates. In
practice, I assume that all changes in the yield on government bonds, R ,are
unanticipated.
When considering the public debt, most researchers deal with the par
value, rather than the market value. (However, some reliable estimates of
market value are now available for the post—World War II period, as discussed
below.) A surprise jump in nominal interest rates has no immediate effect
on the debt when measured at par value. But, as the old debt matures, the12
government effectively replaces itwithnew debt, which bears say a higher
coupon. (I assume that all debt is issued at par.) Thus, if nothing else
changes, the government would face a rising path of real interest payments—--
that is, current real payments would be low relative to the average of anti-
cipated future real paymit.s. As with any path of rising real expenditures,
the government's policy of tax-smoothing requires a rise in the current
tax rate, which means a smaller current deficit. In other words, a surprise
increase in nominal interest rates leads to a gradual reduction over time in
the real debt when measured at par value. In fact, if there are no further
surprises in interest rates (and the debt has finite maturity), then the
real par value gradually approaches the real market value, which fell in a
discrete fashion at the moment of the one—time shift in interest rates.
Using equation (9), the effect on the par value of the debt from a change
in the average coupon rate is
dB/B —dch/(l + hc) . (11)
Suppose that the retirement of old debt means that the coupon rate, c
approaches the market yield, R ,gradually,with the speed of adjustment
depending inversely on the average maturity, h——that is,
dc/dt (l/h)(R —c)
Then, using equation (11), the effect on the par value of the debt is
(1/B)dB/dt—(R—c)/(l +he) . (12)13
Iadd theright—sidevariable (unsuccessfully) to some of the equations
that I estimate below.(I have data on R ,cand h only for the period
since 1946.)
Setup of the Empirical Analysis
The equation that I estimate with annual U.S. data over sub—samples
of the period 1920—82 takes the form,
1o(BIB1) =a0+ a1rre +
a2YVAR+ a3GVAR + a4RVAR+ u , (13)
where u is an error term with the usual properties and the other variables
are as follows:
B: end—of—calendar year (par or market) value of the U.S. government's
interest—bearing public debt, exclusive of holdings at federal
agencies and trust funds or the Federal Reserve. Market—value
figures are based on Seater (1981) and Butkiewicz (1983).
expected rate of inflation (for the CP110), generated as a fore—
casting relation based on the following: two annual lags of inflation,
t—l and t—2' two annual lagsof monetary growth (based on annual
averages of Ml), and and the interest rate on 4—6
month conunercial paper at the end of the previous year, RCt1
That is, the equation for inflation is
=
b0+ b171t1+ b21r2+ b3 1•'t—l+ b4i2+ b5RC1
+ error term. (14)
Thisequationfor inflation is estimated jointly with the debt equation
(13).14
The behavior of inflation in the post—World War II period differs
markedly from that before the war. First, there is positive persistence
in inflation rates from year to year, which is not true earlier; second,
lagged monetary growth is a positive predictor of inflation, which also
does not apply earlier; and third, the variance of the inflation rate——
conditioned on information from the previous year——is much smaller now
than before. Some experimentation indicated that the main break in the
structure of the inflation equation occurred around the Korean War——possibly
with the accords between the Fed and the Treasury, which relieved the Fed
from strict stabilization of interest rates. In any event, I estimate
separate coefficients of the inflation equation (14) for the period up to
1953 and for the recent period, 1954—82. (It turns out that, in order to
maximize the overall value of the likelihood function, it would be slightly
preferable to break the sample at 1955/56. But I have retained the break at
1953/54, which has some rationale a priori.) Note that in equation (13)
the hypothesized coefficient of the e variable is a1 =1




where is a geometric average of the year—end values, B and Bt_l
divided by the GNP deflator for year
I base the measure of temporary real federal spending, g —g
,on
the variable that I used previously (Barro, 198lb) to explain fluctuations
in real GNP. In that approach I isolated mainly the temporary parts of military
spending that accompanied wars. Shifts in the ratio of federal non—defense
expenditures to GNP and shifts during peacetime in the ratio of military
spending to GNP were treated as predominantly permanent (in the sense that15
the ratios followed random walks). Sahasakul (1983) finds additional com-
ponents of temporary real federal spending from the following: 1) a drift
since the 1930s in the ratio of federal transfers to GNP, 2) the tendency
since the 1930s of real federal transfers to move countercyclically, and
3) the tendency of wars to crowd out the non—military components of federal
spending. However, these influences do not introduce variables that are
independent of those that I include anyway in the equation to explain the
growth rate of debt. Mainly, there are implications for the interpretations
of coefficients——for example, the variable GVAR will measure the impact of
temporary wartime spending net of the typical transitory decline in the other
components of real federal spending during wartime. Recall that the tax—
smoothing model predicts that the coefficient of GVAIttinequation (13) is
a3 =1•Butthe crowding—out of other federal spending during wars implies
a3 <1•Inaddition, if tax rates are somewhat above normal during wartime,
then the coefficient a3 would be reduced further below one.
For the cyclical variable YVAR in equation (13), I need a measure of the
temporary shortfall of output, (1—Y/Y) .Inmy previous study (Barro,
1979), I used the deviation of current real GNP, which measured y ,from
trend real GNP, which measured y •13 I again report results with this con—
struct, although it deals incorrectly with permanent shifts to the level of
output. In these cases the variable indicates a permanent departure of
output from normal. The results improve if I use instead the unemployment
rate, ,toproxy for the shortfall in output, (1 —y/y
.Aslong as the
unemployment rate is stationary in levels, this variable will work satisfact-
orily even when there are permanent shifts to the level of output.16
My main results use thetotalunemployment rate (including the military
in the labor force14). Then I assume a stable relation between percentage
shortfalls in output and the departure of the unemployment rate from a fixed
natural rate:
(1 — = — .054) (15)
I take the natural unemployment rate in this formulation to be 5.4%, which
is the median rate over the sample .1890—1982. (The value 5.4% is also
close to the median and mean over the period 1948—82). For the post—World
War II period (for which data are available), I obtain similar results if
I use instead the prime—age male unemployment rate, U .Somepeople argue
that this variable is more stable over long periods than the overall unemploy-
ment rate. Note that in equation (15) the parameter A is an Okun's Law
type coefficient, which is likely to lie between 2 and 3.
As a general statement it would be preferable to construct normal output,
y* ,asan explicit time—series representation for "permanent income." (My
measure for —gdoes take this approach, although only for military
spending.) But I have thus far been unsuccessful along these lines in the
construction of the variable y*
The variable YVAR depends also on normal real federal spending, g
I use here Sahasakul's (1983) concept of normal real federal spending, which
combines normal military spending (which entered above into the construction
of the GVAR variable) with measures of normal real federal spending for
transfers and non—defense purchases. In this context the results are relatively
insensitive to the precise measure of g ,aslong as the variable picks up
the longer term movements in the size of the federal government. But, when17
making comparisons over long periods, it is important to recall that the
growth rate of the debt in equation (13) depends on the YVAR variable, which
equals the percentage shortfall in output, (1 — , multipliedby the
ratio, g*/b .Forexample, in 1982 this last variable is .83, while in
1933 it is .17. Hence——because of the high value of normal real federal
spending in recent years—a one percentage point shortfall in output has
5 times as much effect on the growth rate of debt as it would have in 1933
(where the percentage shortfall in output was much larger).'5
The tax—smoothing model suggests that the coefficient of YVARt in equa-
tion (13) would be a2 1 .However,the countercyclical behavior of trans-
fers and any tendency to lower tax rates during recessions lead toa2 >i
When the unemployment rate proxies for the shortfall in output (equation (15)),
the estimated coefficient on 7AR is also multiplied by the Okun's Law
coefficient, A
The variable RVARt in equation (13) accounts for the effects of change
in interest rates. With the debt measured at par value, the interest—rate
variable (available since 1946) is RVARt =— c)/(l+ ,whetER
is the yield, h is average maturity, c is the average coupon rate, and
overbars signify averages over the year. When the debt is measured at
market value (available accurately since 1941), the interest—rate variable
is RVAR =ht(B
—R1)/(].+ hR) .Inboth cases the hypothesized
coefficient in equation (13) is a4 =—l18
Empirical Results
Table 1 shows joint, maximum—likelihood estimates for the debt equation
(13) and the inflation equation (14). For the debt equations in this table,
the RVAR variable is omitted and the YVAR variable is based on theoverall
unemployment rate. The first six sets of results refer to the sample, 1920—40,
48—82, which excludes the years associated with World War II. The inflation
equations report separate coefficients for the two sub—periods, 1920—40,48—53,
And 1954—82. Also, the observations in the inflation equation for the first
sub—period, 1920—40, 48—53,are weighted by .40 in order to correct for
heteroscedasticity (that is, for a higher error variance in the earlier
sample).
For set 1 in Table 1, the coefficients of the inflation equation in the
earlier sub—period are insignificant except for effects of the
lagged interest rate (coefficient of —1.2, s.e.0.2) and of the second
lag of monetary growth (—.29, s.e,.09). The first effect probably
reflects the tendency for (real) interest rates to be high during financial
crises, which were also times of deflation. The second effect picks up the
tendency for reversals in monetary growth under the earlier monetary regime.
By contrast, for the later sub—period 1954—82, the coefficientsof the first
lags of inflation and monetary growth are each strongly positive (.81, s.e .18;
and .67, s.e. .15, respectively). Surprisingly, the coefficient of the
nominal interest rate is still negative (—.37, s.e. =.14).The results
for the inflation equation remain basically similar in the specifications
discussed later.
Expected inflation, ,iscalculated from the coefficients in the
inflation equation. In set 1 of Table 1, the coefficient of in the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is left free. Note that the unconstrained estimate for this coefficient is
.97, s.e. =.12,which is consistent with the theoretical value of unity.
Therefore, I focus on the constrained results, which appear in set 1.
The estimated coefficient of GVAR (.27, s.e. =.09)is significantly
positive, but well below the value of unity that is suggested by the tax—
smoothing model. The results in Sahasakul (1983) indicate that a small
part of this discrepancy reflects the crowding—out of other components of
federal spending during wartime. But the main element is the tendency
for average tax rates to be above normal during wars. I discuss these results
further when the observations for World War II are included.
The estimated coefficient of YVAR (3.88, s.e. =.26)is positive and
highly significant, which shows the strong countercyclical behavior of
deficits. Dividing by an Okun's Law coefficient of 2—1/2 (see equation 15))
suggests that the reaction of debt growth to shortfalls in output involves
a coefficient of about 1—1/2. The excess of this coefficient above one
reflects the tendency during recessions for average tax rates to be below
normal and for real federal transfers to be above normal (see Sahasakul,
1983, for a detailed breakdown between these two elements). To see the
quantitative effect of unemployment on the deficit, recall that the pertinent
variable is =— .054)-(g/),whichhas an estimated coefficient
of 3.9. In 1982 the variable gt*Ib equals .83, which means that a one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate raises the estimated
growth of the debt by 3.9(0.83) =3.2percentage points per year. For a
debt level of $850 billion (December 1982), the corresponding increase in
the deficit is by 3.2%850 =$27billion.21
The standard—error--of—estimate for the debt equation is a= .023
(that is,2.3percentage points per year). This result corresponds to
an R2 of .91, although the maximization ofR2 is not the criterion for
the estimation.The Durbin—Watson Statistic of 2.2 suggests that serial
correlation of residuals is not a problem.
The results in sets (3)—(6) of Table 1 check whether the debt equation
is stable over various sub—periods. Sets 3 and 4 allow the coefficients
for 1920—40 to differ from those for 1948—82. Sets 5 and 6 specify the
first sub—period as 1920—40, 48—53, and the second as 1954—82. Also, sets
3 and 5 constrain the coefficient of the 1e variable to unity, while sets
4 and 6 relax this constraint. In all cases the hypothesis of stable coeffi-
cients over the two sub—periods is accepted at conventional significance
levels by likelihood—ratio tests. For example, for set 3 (where the samples
are 1920—40 and 1948—82, and where the coefficient ofe is fixed at one),
the value of —21og(likelihood ratio) is 3.2, which is below the 5%
critical value for the x2 distribution with 3 degrees of freedom of 7.8.
For set 4 (where the e coefficients are unrestricted), the test statistic
is 8.2, with a 5% critical value with 4 degrees of frdom of 9.5. The results
are basically similar in sets 5 and 6, where the break in the sampleis at
1953/54.
These findings are important, since they indicate that the process for
generating deficits in the interwar period, 1920—40 (or the period, 1920—40,
1948—5 3) is broadly similar to that in the post—World War II period, 1948—82
(or 1954—82). In particular, the statistical evidence does not support the
idea that there has been a shift toward a fiscal policy that generates more real
public debt on average or that generates larger deficits in response to
recessions.(In set 3 of Table 1, the estimated coefficients of the YVAR22
variable are 3.48, s.e. =.45for 1920—40; and 4.54, s.e. =.45for 1948—82.
However, even this pattern of higher point estimates in the later period
reverses later when I consider an alternative measure of the YVAR variable.)
Sets 7 and 8 of Table 1 deal with the full sample, 1920—82, which adds
the years associated with World War II, 1941—47, to the previous sample.16
Aside from the deterioration in fit——as measured by the standard—error—of—
estimate,——the most striking change is the increase in the coefficient of
- . ___—2—1-1 - — tne.vtxcvariaoie.JNacuraiiy,EfliS va.ioie is tzie pLiucipi souLce UL ueii—
citsduring World War II. The estimated coefficient is now .76, s.e. .05,
which is highly significant and closer to the hypothesized value of unity. But
it is also clear that the present formulation does not satisfactorily include the
observations from World War II into the specification that works satisfactorily
for the other years. One of the problems is that the estimated inflation
eqaution (using the coefficients from the earlier sub—period, 1920—40, 1948—53——
see n. 16 above) generaces implausibly low values of anticipated inflation
during World War II. Specifically, these values are close to zero through-
out the period 1941—45. The specification has to be changed to allow the
earlier monetary regime to generate high values of monetary growth and
inflation during wartime. (similar problems arise when I attempt to add the
observations from World War I, 1917—19.) It is also clear that the measure
of temporary wartime spending, GVAR, is subject to substantial measurement
error during the major wars, which accounts for some of the increase in the
standard—error—of—estimate. This problem can probably be handled by estimating
the GVAR variable (as I did in Barro, 1981b) jointly with the debt and inflation
equations.
Table 2 shows some additional results for the recent sample, 1954—82.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































respectively) are similar to those for the longer sample (with World War II
excluded), as shown in sets 1 and 2 of Table 1.Sets 11 and 12 of Table 2
change the YVAR variable to use the prime—age male unemployment rate,
—.041,where.041 is the mean value of m over the period 1954—82.
Although the fit of the equation for debt growth in sets 11 and 12 is slightly
worse than that in sets 9 and 10, the general nature of the results is similar.
Sets 13 and 14 of Table 2 use the estimated market value of the public
debt, rather than the par value, in the construction of the dependent vari-
able. The equation for debt growth now includes an interest—rate variable,
RVARt, which picks up the effect on the market value of debt from changes in
interest rates. For set 13 (where the coefficient of ,1e is fixed at one),
the estimated coefficient of RVAR is —.83, s.e. =.13,which differs insigni-
ficantly from the hypothesized value of —1. The other results are broadly
similar to those found in sets 9 and 10, which are based on the par value of
public debt.
In sets 15—18 of Table 2 I attempt to find an effect from changes in
interest rates on the growth in debt when measured at par value.(The
variable RVARt is now based on the difference between the yield and the coupon
rate——see the notes to Table 2.) Although the hypothesized coefficient of
RVARt is —1, the estimated values in sets 15 and 16 are positive, but with
very high standard errors. Since the RVARt variable may be proxying for
within—period revisions of expected inflation, I used instead the lagged
value, RVARi, in sets 17 and 18. The estimated coefficients do decrease——
for example, to —.13, s.e..60, in set 17. These results are consistent
with the theoretical value of —1, although the estimates are very imprecise.24
Table 3, which refers to the sample, 1920—40, 1948—82, uses output
relative to trend rather than the unemployment rate in the construction
of the cyclical variable, YVAR. The fits for the debt equation are sub-
stantially worse than those achieved with the unemployment rate——compare,
for example, sets 19 and 20 in Table 3 with sets 1 and 2 in Table 1. It
turns out that the main differences arise in the post—World War II sample,
especially during the 1974—76 recession. In any event the results based on
output relative to trend are still consistent with an unchanged structure
of the debt equation over either the sub—periods, 1920—40 and 1948—82 (sets
21 and 22 of Table 3) or 1920—40, 48—53 and 1954—82 (sets 23 and 24).
One advantage of the results in Table 3 is that the estimated coeffi-
cient of the YVAR variable reveals directly the effect on debt growth from
shortfalls in output. For example, in set 19, the estimated coefficient
is 1.35, s.e. .13. This estimate is significantly above the value of
unity that comes from the tax—smoothing model, although some of this excess
reflects the countercyclical behavior of federal transfers. (Sets 21—24 show
that the point estimates of the YVAR coefficients from the earlier sub—periods
exceed those from the later sub—periods, which reverses the pattern found
before with the unemployment rate. However, these differences across sub—
periods are statistically insignificant.)
Some Episodes of U.S. Debt Issue
Table 4 shows actual and estimated values for the growth rate of nominal
debt, DB ,andthe inflation rate, ,overthe sample 1920—40, 1948—82.
The estimated values come from the regressions shown in set 1 of Table 1
(where the coefficient of
e
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Tables 1—3
For the debt equation, the dependent variable, DBt ,isthe growth rate
from end—December to end—December of the privately—held, interest—bearing
public debt. The figures are par value except for sets 13—14, which use
market values. For the inflation equation, the dependent variable,
is the growth rate (January to January) of the CPI (measured without the
shelter component since 1947).
The inflation equation (in sets 1—8 and 19—24) allows for separate coeffi-
cients for the sub—period up to 1953 and for the later sub—period, 1954—82.
The earlier observations are weighted by .40 (the maximum likelihood estimate
from set 1) to correct for heteroscedasticity. In sets 7—8, which include
World War II, the observations for 1943—47 are deleted from the inflation
equation.
For the debt equation, there are separate coefficients over two sub—
periods in the cases indicated (Sets 3—6 and 21—24). Otherwise, a single set
of coefficients applies for the full sample. In any event, the variance of
the error tenu is assumed to be constant for the full sample.
E is the log of the value of the likelihood function. The independent
variable yeiscalculated as a forecast of from the coefficients of the
inflation equation. The value I indicates that the coefficient of this variable
is constrained to unity, The variable GVAR, based on temporary military
spending, is discussed in the text.
The cyclical variable YVAR, described in the text, is based on the overall unem-
ployment rate, Ut—.054, for sets 1—10 and 13—18. Sets 11 and 12 use the prime—age
male unemployment rate, Um —.041.Sets 19—24 use real CNPrelativeto trend.
In sets 13—14 of Table 2 (which use the market value of debt), the variable
RVARt =ht(RtR..i)/(1 +lrR),whereR is the average yield on government
debt and h is the average maturity. Overbars indicate_estimates of averages
over the year. For sets 15—16 the variable is RVARt (Rt —)'(1 + tC)
where c is the average coupon rate on government debt. Sets 17—18 use the
lagged value of this last measure of RVAR.
a is the standard—error—of—estimate. D.W. (shown below )isthe Durbin—
Watson statistic.
In the inflation equation, ir.1 and are lagged values of the
dependent variable, t—l and Ut..2 are lagged values of monetary growth
(based on annual averages of Ml), and RCt..l is the value from the previous
December of the 4—6 month rate on commercial paper.26a
Table 4
Values of Debt Growth and Inflation
DB DB-DB DB IT
1920 —.038 —.026 —.012 —.014 —.021 .007
1921 —.039 —.030 —.009 —.117 —.091 —.026
1922 —.036 —.054 .018 —.008 —.062 .054
1923 —.038 —.045 .007 .027 —.010 .038
1924 —.049 —.036 —.014 .002 —.028 .030
1925 .000 —.049 .049 .036 —.018 .054
1926 —.112 —.073 —.039 —.023 —.022 .000
1927 —.064 —.072 .008 —.015 —.038 .023
1928 —.049 —.048 —.001 —.010 —.023 .013
1929 —.059 —.072 .013 .000 —.031 .031
1930 —.007 .009 —.016 —.073 —.030 —.043
1931 .084 .132 —.048 —.106 —.008 —.098
1932 .123 .116 .007 —.103 —.021 —.082
1933 .162 .147 .015 .026 .010 .016
1934 .167 .172 —.005 .030 .040 —.011
1935 .177 .135 .042 .015 .036 —.022
1936 .104 .082 .022 .019 .016 .003
1937 .029 .032 —.002 .009 —.014 .023
1938 .043 .064 —.021 —.019 —.011 —.008
1939
•
.070 .081 —.011 —.002 .015 —.018
1940 .072 .090 —.018 .012 .030 —.018
1948 —.038 —.018 —.019 .008 —.008 .016
1949 .035 .006 .029 —.030 .002 —.032
1950 —.014 .019 —.033 .082 .015 .067
1951 —.018 .013 —.031 .041 .017 .023
1952 .019 .003 .016 .002 .014 —.012
1953 .019 —.022 .041 .007 .001 .006
1954 .013 .027 —.014 —.012 .018 —.031
1955 .000 —.019 .018 .000 —.001 .001
1956 —.029 —.010 —.019 .033 .013 .020
1957 —.011 .001 —.012 .034 .025 .010
1958 .033 .038 —.005 .013 .019 —.006
1959 .035 .001 .034 .011 .008 .004
1960 —.014 .011 —.025 .016 .018 —.002
1961 .022 .022 .000 .007 .005 .002
1962 .018 .002 .016 .014 .009 .005
1963 .006 .014 —.009 .015 .018 —.003

































































































































Notes: DBt 1og(B/B1) ,where is the value from the end of
December of the privately—held part of the interest—bearing public
debt—that is, the gross public debt less holdings by federal
agencies and trust funds and the Federal Reserve and less 2nv non
jterest—bearing debt.(See Barro, 1979, for details.) DBt is the
estimated value from set 1 of Table 1.
log(P÷1/P) ,wheret is the January value of the seasonally—
adjusted CI (less shelter sfnce 1947). 7r is the estimated value
from set 1 of Table 1.2 6c
Table 5
Values of Explanatory Variables
GVAR YVAR g* / h
1917 1.203 —.004 1.12
1918 1.067 —.036 .89
1919 .284 —.014 .37
1920 —.072 .001 .31
1921 .015 .012 .16
1922 —.067 .004 .20
1923 —.071 —.006 .24
1924 —.070 .000 .22
1925 —.083 —.005 .25
1926 —.088 —.009 .28
1927 —.089 —.005 .29
1928 —.096 —.002 .32
1929 —.101 —.006 .34
1.930 —.092 .014 .31
1931 —.069 .039 .31
1932 —.048 .036 .17
1933 —.045 .036 .17
1934 —.045 .035 .25
1935 —.037 .026 .22
1936 —.034 .017 .30
1g37 —.035 .012 .24
1938 —.029 .019 .22
1939 —.029 .017 .23
1940 .008 .013 .24
1941 .147 .003 .35
1942 .476 —.008 .41
1943 .571 —.010 .27
1944 .494 —.008 .19
1945 .345 —.005 .14
1946 .039 —.002 .15
1947 —.016 —.003 .18
1948 —.022 —.004 .22
1949 —.034 .001 .25
1950 —.012 —.001 .23
1951 .044 —.007 .30
1952 .053 —.009 .36
1953 .029. —.010 .40
1954 .002 .000 .3626d
Tab1jpnd
AR*/b
1955 —.033 —.005 .39
1956 —.036 —.006 .41
1957 —.038 —.006 .46
1958 —.041 .005 .47
1959 —.052 .000 .48
1960 —.054 .000 .49
1961 —.053 .006 .52
1962 —.053 —.001 .57
1963 —.058 .001 .57
1964 —.062 —.002 .59
1965 —.051 —.006 .62
1966 —.007 —.013 .70
1967 .041 —.013 .74
1968 .055 —.016 .78
1969 .038 —.017 .85
1970 —.018 —.005 .91
1971 —.055 .003 .94
1972 —.061 .000 .98
1973 —.087 —.007 1.06
1974 —.087 .000 1,16
1975 ,076 .032 1.10
1976 —073 .021 .99
1977 —.067 014 .95
1978 —.063 005 .96
1979 —.060 .003 .97
1980 —.050 .016 .98
1981 —.049 .020 .94
1982 —.040 .034 .83
Notes: GVARt (t—8)Ib ,where istemporary real
defense spending (based on Barro, 1981b), and
where Bt is the privately—held public debt at the end of year
t(Table4) and is the GNPdeflatorfor year t
JAR(U
—.054).g/b
,where is the unemployment rate
in the total labor force (adjusted as suggested by Darby (1976)
for 1933—43) and g is normal real federal spending, based on
Sahasakul (1983).27
values of the explanatory variables, CVAR and YVAR (based on the overall
unemployment rate), as well as the ratio, g*/b ,whichenters into the
construction of the YVAR variable.
Note first the negative values of DB and (i.e., "surpluses")
throughout the 1920s. These derive first, from negative values of anticipated
inflation, especially for 1921—22; second, from the economic boom (negative
values of the cyclical variable, YVAR) for most of 1923—29; and third, from
relatively low values of the GVAR variable. From 1931—40 the values of debt
growth are all positive (i.e., "deficits"). This behavior reflects the
countercyclical response of deficits to the Depression (that is, to the
positive values of the cyclical variable, YVAR, particularly for 1931—35).
There are large increases in real federal spending during the New Deal
period after 1932, but not in the wartime spending that is the basis for my
measure of temporary spending, GVAR. Therefore, higher federal spending
is not a major element in my estimates of debt growth during the 1930s.
(The variable GVAR equals (g —g*)/,which is negative but declining in
magnitude during the 1930s because of the substantial rise in the real debt,
b.) However, the higher real spending on non—defense items——which I implicitly
treat as permanent——would account for the 1arg increases in tax rates that
occurred under Hoover and Roosevelt from 1932—36. (See Barro and Sahasakul,
1983, for further discussion.) In any event, the actual debt growth, DB
'St isreasonably in line with the esthnated values, DB ,throughoutthe 1930s.
I have already mentioned that the dramatic increases in public debt
during World War II derive primarily from the hi values of temporary federal
spending, as reflected ii the GVAR variable. In fact, the average growth
rate of the nominal debt from the end of 1940 until the end of 1945 is 34%
per year. (From the ewi of 1916 until the end of 1919 it is over 100% per year.)28
However, since my detailed results for the periods of the world wars are pre-
sently unsatisfactory, I cannot say much more about these episodes.
For the post—World War II period, note first that neither the actual
noT estimated values of debt growth are very high during the Korean War,
say 1951—53. The values of GVAR are high, but those for the cyclical variable,
YVAR, are low. Also, the calculated values of expected inflation,
are relatively low at this time. The response of deficits to recessions
shows up, for example, in 1949, 1954, 1958 and 1961. The Kennedy—Johnson
tax cuts for 1964—65 do not correspond to notable residuals in the equation
for debt growth.
For the Vietnam War——say 1966—68—the positive residuals for debt
growth support the common view that taxes were raised insufficiently at this
time.But,perhaps because of the surcharge on the income tax, a substantial
negative residual does show up for 1969.
Since 1969, expected inflation has become an important influence on
the deficit, as measured by the growth in the nominal debt. In particular,
the values ofe (which havea one—to—one effect on the estimates of debt
A
growth,DB) are between 4 and 6% for 1969—73, increase to 9% for 1974—75,
fall to between 6 and 8% for 1976—79, reach 10% in 1980, and then decline
to 6% for 1981—82.
The debt equation underpredicts the deficits during the recession years,
1975—76. (However, the error is much greater if the YVAR variable is based
on real GNP relative to trend rather than the unemployment rate.) But
the debt quation is basically on track for the 1980—82 recession. For 1982,
the actual growth rate of the nominal debt is 20% (corresponding to an increase
by $155 billion in the nominal, privately—held, interest—bearing debt),
while the estimated value is 19%. This estimate breaks down into29
6 percentage points due to anticipated inflation (rt=6%,although
=4%)and 13 percentage points due to the recession (YVAR =.034,
basedon the unemployment rate of 9.5%). Because nothing special is going
on with the constructed measure of temporary federal spending, GVAR, it
turnsoutthat the constant and the contribution from the GVARvariable
essentially cancel out.
I also use the estimated equation to forecast deficits for 1983 and
1984. The inflation equation implies the value =4.8%for 1983.(The
actual value of the inflation rate for 1983 is around 3.5%.) The main element
in the decline of inflationary expectations from 1982 to 1983 is the low
actual rate of inflation, =4.1%,for1982. Usingthe actual
unemployment rate of 95% for 1983, the resulting estimate for debt growth,
A
DB ,for1983 is 16.6%. Note that 4.8 percentage points of this total
come from expected inflation, while 11.8 percentage points derive from the
continuing effect of the recession. (The combined effect of the constant
and the GVAR variable is near zero..) The projected value for debt growth
implies that the level of debt would increase from $848 billion at the end
of December 1982 to $1,001 billion at the end of December 1983. Thus, the
predicted nominal deficit—in the sense of the change in the privately—held,
interest—bearing public debt——for calendar 1983 is $153 billion. (In order
to get closer to conventional measures of the deficit, one should add the
increase in high—powered money, which is roughly $15 billion for calendar
1983.) The data that I have at this writing (kindly supplied to me by Eric
}janushek) indicate that the actual value of privately—held public debt at
the end of December 1983 is around $1,018 billion. This figure implies
an actual growth rate of the debt, DB ,of18.3% for 1983, as compared to30
my projected value of 16.6%. The gap of .017 between actual and estimated
values is not out of line w-ith the fitted equation, for which the standard—
error—of—estimate was=.023.The actual deficit——in the sense of the
change in the nominal, privately—held debt for calendar 1983 is about $170
billion, as compared to my forecast of $153 billion.
For 1984, the value of turns out to be 6.6%. The main reason for
the rise from 1983 (where =4.8%)is the increase in the annual
average rate of monetary growth from 6.3% in 1982 to 10.3% in 1983. Assuming
an unemployment rate of 7.8% for 1984 (see, for example, Litterman, 1984),
the projected value of debt growth, DB ,for1984 turns out to be 13.37..
This forecast breaks up into 6.6 percentage points from expected inflation
and 6.7 percentage points from the cyclical variable, YVAR. The forecast
implies that the level of debt would rise from about $1,018 billion at the
end of 1983 to $1,163 billion at the end of 1984, or by $145 billion during
calendar 1984. (Again, one should add about $15 billion for the creation of
high—powered money to get closer to the standard concept of the nominal
deficit.) This forecast seems to be roughly in line with other near—term
projections of deficits. It also turns out that my forecasts for 1983—84
are basically similar if I use either the equation where the YVAR variable
is based on output relative to trend (Table 3, set 19), or the one based
on the pr-ime—age male unemployment rate (Table 2, set 11).
The main point is that the actual behavior of public debt through
1983——as well as popular forecasts for 1984——are reasonably well in line
with the experience of debt issue since at least the end of World War I. The
main things that are out of line with the previous structure are projections
of longer—term deficits on the order of $300 billion, conditioned on relatively
low values of the unemployment rate and expected inflation. Since there is31
nothing yet in the data to suggest this type of structural break, I view
these forecasts of deficits as amounting to predictions that either taxes will
be increased or spending decreased. Standard projections of deficits should
not be regarded as forecasts, once the endogeneity of taxes and spending
is taken into account.
For recent years, where the effects of the constant term ad the GVAR
variable turn out to cancel, the forecasts of debt growth——and hence deficits——
c,..-.,,, 1?1.. '4UL.i.*JU.'I1Lt.Ly ,
lTht
=+39YVAR =+3.9(U —
Thevalues for g*Ibuntil1982 appear in Table 5, while the values for
1983 and 1984 are .75 and (roughly) .71, respectively. Using the value .71
in the expression above, the forecasting equation becomes
e
DB —.15 + 7r + 2.8.U (16)
Equation (16) provides a close approximation to the previously mentioned
forecasts of debt growth for 1983—84. The equation would also apply satis-
factorily to projections further out, subject to the absence of major changes
in the ratio of normal federal spending to the debt, .(Recallthat
this ratio rose by a factor of 5 from 1933 to 1982.17) Notably, equation (16)
e
implies that the planned growth rate of the real debt, DBt —, would
approach zero if the unemployment rate were to decline to about 5—1/2%. It
implies further that the projected growth rate of the nominal debt, DBt__
which determines the conventional nominal deficit (aside from changes in
high—powered money)——would approach zero if, in addition, the expected rate32
of inflation were to approach zero. The point is that thereis nothing in
the experience of actual deficits through 1963 that conflictsin any major
way with these projections.
\\33
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FOOTNOTES
1Some related work is Kydland and Prescott (1980) and Lucas and Stokey
(1983). The general idea of the implicationsof tax—smoothing for the behavior
of deficits appears also in Pigou (1928, Ch. VI).
2This formulation assumes that the real interest rate exceeds the economy's
steady—state growth rate. For a discussion, seeMcCalluxn (1984).
3.nticipated inflation amounts to a form of excise tax. But, unanti-
cipated inflation entails a capital levy, which hasdifferent implications
for the excess burden of taxation (see, for example, Barro1983). However,
changes in other kinds of taxes can also imply capitallevies.
4For dlscussion9 of Ramsey taxation, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980,
Chapter 12) and Ramsey (1927).
5Kydland and Prescott (1980, pp. 185—86) suggest that this rule will
be close to optimal if intertemporal substitutionseffects are strong.
6These assumptions rule out any drift in the ratio, gly.Inthe long
run this drift would be subject to the bounds,0 <g/y<1
7See Lucas and Stokey (1983) for a treatment of uncertainty.35
a previous study (Barro, 1981a), I accepted the random—walk hypo-
thesis for average tax rates, although the statistical tests were not very
powerful. Subsequently, I have rejected the random—walk hypothesis for
some revised systems. Sahasakul (1983) finds evidence that average marginal
tax rates are lower than normal during recessions and higher than normal
during wars.
91f an increase in the debt—income ratio raises the required real
interest rate payable on public debt (perhaps because of an increasing
probability of the government's default), then there would be a force that
deters the government from amassing very high debt—income ratios.
10These inflation rates are January—to—.January values, using the CPI
less shelter since 1947. For 1943—47, the data are strongly affected by
price controls. Instead of using the reported price levels, I substituted
values based on the extrapolation of an estimated price—level equation from
some previous research (Barro, 198lc, p. 157). This adjustment shifts the
inflation rates as follows: from 2.9% to 25.8% for 1943, from 2.3% to
13.0% for 1944, from 2.2% to 3.2% for 1945, from 16.7% to —4.8% for 1946,
and from 10.2% to —2.9% for 1947. This procedure affects the subsequent
results mainly for the samples that include the World War II years.(There
are also some effects of lagged inflation rates on the estimates for 1948—49.)
Theoretica1ly, the annual average of would matter, which means
that some updating of expectations for current—period information comes into36
play. Thepresentprocedure excludes current—period information (and
thereby avoids some econometric problems). I used thecommercial paper rate,
rather than say a 1—year Treasury Bill rate, in order to have aconsistent
variable for the full sample. The difference between a 4—6 month maturity
and a 1—year maturity would not be of major significance for the results.
12The formsofthe YVAR and GVAR variables in equation (13) arise as
an approximation for discrete—time data to the continuous—timeformulation
in equation (8). The approximation seems to be satisfactory exceptfor the
very large values of — g)Ibthat arise at the start of World War I.
13For trend real GNP, the growth rate was 3.4% per year since 1946 and
before 1914. From 1915—45, the two trend lines were connected, implying an
average growth rate of 2,5% per year.
14 also adjust the values from 1933—43 as suggested by Darby (1976)
to include New Deal workers as employed.
15The ratio of the real deficit to real GNP, (db/dt)Iy ,dependson
This last variable is .21 in 1982 and .06 in 1933.
16Because of the problems with price controls (n. 10 above), I exclude
the years 1943—47 from the inflation equation. The values of for these
years are those implied by the estimated coefficientsfor the earlier sub—
period, 1920—40, 1948—53.37
one plugs in the 1933 unemployment rate of 27% into equation (16),
then (with =6%)the projected growth rate of debt is a remarkable 67%.
The actual growth rate of debt for 1933 was only 16%, which I attribute pri-
marily to the smaller size of the federal government, as measured by the
ratio, g*/b .Myassessment is that, if the U.S. encounters a much more
serious recession than that in 1982, then (with no change in structure) we
will observe numbers for deficits that dwarf those experienced recently.
The main element that generates high real deficits is the interaction between
recession (high unemployment) and big government.